A Case Study on the Failure on Apollo 13 by Anderson, Brenda Lindley
A Case Study on the Failure on 
Apollo 13
Brenda Lindley Anderson
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center
Huntsville, AL, USA
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20110015764 2019-08-30T17:29:48+00:00Z
Failure on Apollo 13
• At 46:40:02 Mission Elapsed Time during the Apollo 
13 mission, both oxygen tank fans were powered on, 
hopefully to get a more accurate reading of the tank 
pressure.  Tank #1 had performed without anomaly 
in testing but began to show odd readings after the 
mission commenced.  Tank #2 had multiple issues 
since manufacture.
• Extended use of the heaters on O2 #2 had, in an 
effort to empty the tank in testing had, apparently, 
melted the Teflon insulation.  However, what caused 
the tank difficulty such that it would not empty 
normally, as such tanks had previously?
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Manufacturing History Oxygen Tank #2
• Tank #2 was manufactured as two hemispheres 
and joined.  Electrical and fill tubes are inserted.  
Bolting and wiring occurs through the opening at 
top.
• Weld porosity was detected and repaired.
• Upper fan motor extracted excessive current and 
was noisy, leading to replacement. 
• Heater assembly tube required replacement, 
which included new heaters and fans.
Oxygen Tank #2 Testing at Manufacturer
• Acceptance testing demonstrated that the heat 
leak rate into the tank was greater than allowable 
by specification.  The tank was reworked but the 
leak rate was still high.
• A formal waiver was submitted and accepted for 
the tank to be used “as is”.
Assembly and Testing of O2 Tank Shelf
• Oxygen tank #2 was added to the shelf which 
secures both O2 tanks in the Service Module 
(SM).  No anomalies noted in testing.
• Electromagnetic interference had been recorded 
on earlier Apollo spacecraft, caused by the O2 
tank vacuum ion pump.  A design modification 
eliminated the anomaly.  The pumps were to be 
replaced on this O2 tank shelf.
Hoist and Sling for Shelf Assembly
Lift Incident
• The tank shelf was disconnected from the SM 
and the crane placed under it to lift it from 
position.  By mistake one bolt had been left in.  
The crane lifted approximately two feet, and 
then broke, dropping the shelf back into 
position.
• External photos were taken and calculations 
were performed to estimate the force from 
the fall.  After the vacuum ion pump was 
replaced, no further anomalies were noted 
and no other work performed on the O2 tank.
O2 Tank Testing at KSC
• A countdown demonstration test (CDDT) was 
performed with no anomalies during tank filling.  
However, O2 tank #2 would not empty.  The 
CDDT was completed and then dialogue 
conducted concerning the tank.
• The decision was that there was a leak in the line 
between the quantity probe and fill line in the 
tank because of the loose fit between tube and 
sleeve.  A leak would allow gox to leak into the 
fill line, not driving lox from the tank.  A 
discrepancy report was written.
O2 Tank Testing at KSC…contd.
• Heating the fill line and using higher pressure O2 
did not empty the tank post-CDDT.
• It was decided to use the tank heaters to boil out 
the lox.  They were connected to GSE power supply 
of 65 V dc rather than the usual operating supply 
of 28 V dc from the SM.  The fans were also turned 
on to help drive out the oxygen.
• After eight hours of operation, the heaters and 
fans were turned off and the tank was empty.
Pre-launch discussion of O2 tank
• KSC personnel were certain that the loose fitting was 
the reason for O2 tank not emptying.  They decided to 
see if the tank would fill now without problem.
• If the tube was loose, it could cause a short in flight but 
not generate enough heat to cause a problem.  This 
would be the flight rationale.  Tank #2 again required 
pressure cycling and heating to empty.
• The pre-launch discussions focused on the loose fitting 
and did not address the extended operation of the 
heaters and fans or the drop during re-work.  Most 
individuals in the discussions knew little about the 
history of the tank, except for the emptying difficulty.
Pre-launch discussion of O2 tank…contd.
• The heater has a thermostatic switch as protection 
against extreme heat.  The switch should open at 80 ⁰ F.  
Switches of this type were tested post-failure, and 
failed to open when the heaters were operated at GSE 
power of 65 V dc.  The switches were rated at 28 V dc, 
standard operating power for the SM.
• Data recorded during CDDT was reviewed in post-
failure investigation and showed that the heater 
switches did not open during the extended heater 
operation post-CDDT.  Further testing demonstrated 
that the temperature could have reached a high of 
1000⁰ F inside the O2 tank, which was shown to cause 
severe damage to the Teflon insulation on the wiring 
inside the tank.
• The decision makers did not have any of this 
information available during pre-launch discussions.
Summary of Findings
• The post-failure investigation determined that 
extended operation of the heater damaged the 
wiring inside O2 #2.
• Apparently during other stir operations prior to the 
explosion, the damaged wires didn’t come in contact 
enough to spark.  The right conditions had to be in 
position to cause the arcing which led to the blast.
Unanswered Questions
• However, the unanswered question from the failure 
investigation is: what led to the tank to be in such a 
condition that it would not empty, thus leading to 
the extreme heating environment?
• Why did the failure of the heater thermostatic 
switches go unnoticed, causing the extreme heating 
environment?
• What caused the high confidence level in a loose 
fitting sleeve, leading to incomplete history being 
presented to the decision makers?
